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This Article argues that the primary value society receives in the patentee social contract is
not new inventions, but "unclaimed consideration." Unclaimed consideration takes many forns:
additional innovations to improve on the patented invention, additional innovations created through
efforts to design around the patented invention, innovations created by losers in the patent race,
innovations informed by the unclaimed technical information in patents, commercialization of the
patented invention or these other innovations, and the signals that patents give to investors
regarding the value of a company or research lab. While there are many schools of patent
scholarship engaged in spirited debate regarding how patents serve (or fail to serve) society this
Article is the first to recognize and map the growing consensus among modem patent heories that
unclaimed consideration is of significant value and importance to society Indeed the majority of
claimed inventions are never commercialized and so granting the patent monopoly in most cases
can only be justified by society receiving some other form of consideratton. Courts should
therefore guard the boundaries ofpatent claims to avoid the perverse result of allowing the thicket
of claimed inventions to stifle the development of unclaimed consideration. This Article
demonstrates this point through a case study of Siemens Medical Solutions v Saint-Gobain
Ceramics & Plastics, in which the United States Court ofAppeals for the Federal Circuit decided
that a product can infrnge on a patent even after it is declared by the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO) to be separately patentable and non-obvious over the asserted patent.I
The majority of a sharply divided court thereby allowed a broad doctrine of equivalents to ensnare
unclaimed consideration, relying on reasoning myopically wed to the belief that the sole way in. 2
which the patent laws promote scientific progress is by incentivizing claimed inventions. Courts
instead should protect unclaimed consideration, which modem patent theory recognizes is the
substantial return society ought to receive in return for the patent grant.
* © 2015 Samuel F Ernst. Associate Professor of Law, Fowler School of Law,
Chapman University. I thank Dean Tom Campbell, Associate Dean Donald J. Kochan, and other
faculty at the Fowler School of Law for their comments on this Article. I also thank my research
assistant, April Mara Crystal.
I. See Siemens Med. Sols. USA, Inc. v. Saint-Gobain Ceramics & Plastics, Inc., 637
F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
2. Id.
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I. INTRODUCTION
"You can patent that?" That is what an engineer once asked me
during deposition prep when I showed him the asserted patent. And this
was not the first time. Showing patents to high-tech innovators often
elicits a variation of the following question: How can you patent
something that is so very obvious, inefficient, or has been independently
and simultaneously developed in some variation and used throughout the
industry?
Indeed, the value of most claimed inventions to society is dubious.
Less than half of all patents are ever commercialized and only about 5%
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of patents are ever licensed for a royalty.' This means that most claimed
inventions serve no immediately perceivable direct benefit to society in
the form of a useable product.! To the contrary, in some technology
areas, patents may harm innovation.! Many scholars have complained of
"a patent thicket" in particular industries, a large number of low quality
patents that serve no other purpose than to create mazes through which
innovators must navigate in order to bring a product to market.' As
Christopher Cotropia has argued, "these early-filed and undeveloped
patents do little more than generate costs to other developers."' At best
they stand as roadblocks to be navigated by innovators. At worst they
become licensing and litigation tools that directly tax innovation.8
3. Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341,362-64 (2010).
4. Id. at 355 ("[A]bsent consumable, commercial products incorporating this informa-
tion, patent law would provide little benefit to the public.").
5. Throughout this Article, I shall be referring to the distinction between inventions and
innovations. This distinction was excellently articulated by Robert P. Merges:
An invention refers to the practical implementation of the inventor's idea. This often
takes the form of a prototype or model. An invention, then, is more than a concept (it is
usually a tangible thing), but less than the fully worked out product or process first
offered for sale to customers. An innovation is the "debugged" and functional version
of the invention: the version first offered for sale.
Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives on
Innovation, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 803, 807 (1988).
6. See, e.g., Amber Rose Stiles, Hacking Through the Thicket A Proposed Patent
Pooling Solution to the Nanotechnology "Building Block" Patent Thicket Problem, 4 DREXEL L.
REV. 555, 562 (2012) ("The dense tangle of existing IP rights prevents downstream entities from
producing innovative technology because they cannot afford to license the litany of 'building
block' patents necessary to provide protection from infringement litigation'"); Carl Shapiro,
Navigating the Patent Thicket- Cross Licenses, Patent Pools and Standard-Setting, in I
INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119-26 (Adam B. Jaffe, Josh Lemer & Scott Stem eds.,
2001) ("[As patent thicket is a] web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company
must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology."); Stu Woolman et
al., Evidence of Patent Thickets in Complex Biopharmaceutical Technologies, 53 IDEA 1, 3
(2013) ("First, one initially observes a thicket effect when a downstream commercial seller must
acquire a license from two or more patent owners. Second, the thicket effect becomes quite
pronounced when there are three or more patent owners. Third, where four or more patent owners
exist, the thicket effect is so strong that a potential seller will find it virtually impossible to
negotiate successfully all of the licenses necessary to create a downstream commercially viable
product."); Amit Makker, The Nanotechnology Patent Thicket and the Path to Commercialization,
84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1163, 1175-76 (2011) ("Generally, a patent thicket will require an innovator to
seek out and negotiate licenses with many patent holders in the field of endeavor to ensure that
the innovator will not be sued for patent infingement when building upon the work of others.
Not only could the licenses themselves be costly, the transaction costs associated with seeking out
these patent holders could also be large.").
7. Christopher A. Cotropia, The Folly of Early Filing in Patent Law, 61 HASTINGS L.J.
65, 112 (2009).
8. See id. ("Uncommercialized patents also fuel the use of patents as a litigation tool.").
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This patent thicket would impose less of a tax on innovation if
patent holders themselves were bringing products to market; however, the
majority of patent litigation is brought by nonpracticing entities-"patent
trolls" who acquire patents not in order to put products on the market, but
to obtain licensing fees (through litigation if necessary) from companies
that do endeavor to develop, manufacture, and sell new products.9 One
study reported that patent trolls imposed direct litigation costs of $29
billion on defendants in 2011 alone."0 This figure does not even include
the substantial royalties paid to patent trolls in licensing negotiations to
avoid the cost of litigation." In this context, claimed inventions serve as
a tax on innovation, impeding or even preventing the efficient
commercialization of new products for the public.
If the foregoing account is to be credited,'2 it raises the question as
to whether society is receiving sufficient valuable consideration in
exchange for the patent monopoly. The Constitution of the United States
gives the United States Congress the authority to grant patents in order to
achieve a stated societal good. Society incurs the cost to competition of
ceding limited monopolies to individuals in order "[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts."13 The Supreme Court of the United
States has employed the metaphor of a contract to describe this
relationship between society and the patent holder: the government
grants the exclusionary right in exchange for "the quid pro quo of
substantial creative effort."'14
Under the traditional "reward theory" of patent protection, the
consideration that society receives in exchange for the patent grant is the
9. Robin Feldman, Thomas Ewing & Sara Jeruss, The AlA 500 Expanded- The Effects
of Patent Monetization Entities, 17 UCLA J. L. & TECH. 1, 16 (2013) (estimating that
nonpracticing entities filed 58.7% of the patent infringement lawsuits in 2012).
10. James E. Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99
CORNELL L. REv. 387, 408 (2014).
11. Id. at 409.
12. And it need not be. See, e.g., James F. McDonough, The Myth of the Patent Troll"
An Alternative View of the Function of Patent Dealeis in an Idea Economy, 56 EMoRY L.J. 189,
216-23 (2006) (arguing that the evolution of an efficient market for inventions gives inventors an
incentive to invent and gives the public "easier and broader access to inventions"); see also Ryan
T Holte, Trolls or Great Inventors: Case Studies of PatentAssertion Entities, 59 ST. Louis U. L.J.
1, 11-12 (2015) (summarizing the scholarship concluding that "individual inventors are being
encouraged to invent through economic return from patent licensing allowed by [patent assertion
entities]").
13. U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
14. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 161 (1989). But see
Shubha Ghosh, Patents and the Regulatory State. Rethinking the Patent Bargain MetaphorAfter
Eldred, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1315, 1349 (2004) ("The metaphor of the patent bargain rests on
a naive view of social contract theory, based on questionable assumptions about private orderings,
that reduces patent law to a tool for protecting property rights.").
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inventions claimed in patents.5 This traditional view maintains that the
sole purpose and function of the patent system is to induce inventors to
make claimed inventions by rewarding them with a temporary monopoly.
Mark E Grady and Jay I. Alexander have described the theory as follows:
"Although English classical economists like Adam Smith accepted the
traditional view that monopoly was 'necessarily hurtful' to society, they
nonetheless thought a temporary monopoly granted to an inventor was a
good way to reward the inventor's risk and expense."'6 In modem times,
the reward theory has been repeated and extended. John Bates Clark
justified the patent system by stressing the relatively free appropriability
of new ideas.'7 In the absence of a publicly enforced property right, he
argued, there would be too little invention.'8 In essence, the reward
theory maintains that when the Constitution seeks "[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and the useful Arts" by giving Congress the power to
issue patents, the sole measure of that "progress" is the receipt by society
of patented inventions.'9
But if the claimed inventions that society receives in this contract
either never see the light of day because they remain uncommercialized
or stand in the way of innovation by creating a patent thicket, it calls into
question the utility of the patent system.
Perhaps the "progress" gained by granting and publishing a patent is
not the particular invention that is claimed in the patent. Perhaps the
more valuable forms of consideration are the further inventions,
innovations, market entries, and scientific knowledge that are indirectly
caused by the existence of patents. This second category of
consideration that society receives for a patent we will call "unclaimed
consideration." It is informed by the technical teaching of patents, or
inspired by attempts to design around, improve, combine, and build on
15. See CRAIG ALLEN NARD, THE LAW OF PATENTS 31 (2d ed. 2011) ("The historically
predominant theory is the incentive to invent which focuses on efficiency gains and the
internalization of externalities").
16. Mark F. Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 VA. L. REV
305, 310 (1992) (citing ADAM SMrH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 189, 339 (James E. Thorold
Rogers, ed., Oxford, The Clarendon Press 2d ed. 1880) (1776)).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 311 (citing JOHN B. CLARK, ESSENTIALS OF ECONOMIC THEORY 358-72 (photo.
reprint 1968) (1927)); see also NARD, supra note 15, at 31 ("This theory seeks to address the
effects of Arrow's Information Paradox, and holds that-due to the public goods nature of
information-without the prospect of a property right, inventors would be unable to recoup
(internalize) their research and development costs because third parties could simply copy the
invention and compete with the inventor unencumbered by the need to recover fixed costs.").
19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see Merges, supra note 5, at 805-12 (arguing that the
courts improperly take into account commercial success in the obviousness determination,
because the patent system should directly award inventions, not innovations).
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patented inventions and technical information disclosed in patents.° It
can also be the indirect result of a patent race or the investment inspired
by the signals a patent portfolio gives potential investors in a company.
There is broad disagreement among the various schools of modem
patent scholarship regarding how the patent law should foster innovation.
Should the law grant broad upstream rights or narrow downstream
rights? Should patent exclusivity or free competition best drive
innovation?2' One scholar has described the state of patent scholarship as
a "stalemate of empirical intuitions."22 However, if one reads into the
various schools of thought carefully, there appears to be growing
consensus on one issue. Whatever value society receives in exchange for
a patent grant, it is substantially (if not primarily) something other than
the claimed inventions themselves; it is unclaimed consideration.
Unclaimed consideration is not necessarily a positive externality, or
"spillover,' 3 because the inventor herself may well capture the value of
this unclaimed consideration (for example, by developing the invention
into an innovation or using the patent signals to communicate
information about her company). It is, rather, any of the benefits
received by society as consideration in exchange for the patent grant that
is beyond the value of the claimed inventions themselves.
Part I of this Article reviews the various schools of modern patent
scholarship to show how they all value unclaimed consideration.
A. Disclosure Theory
Disclosure theory recognizes the value of the technical teachings
contained in patents, including those teachings that are not claimed as
inventions." Recent research demonstrates that technical information
contained in patents is more valuable to researchers than once believed.
In a survey of nanotechnologists by Lisa Larrimore Ouellet, the majority
(64%) of respondents stated that hey had consulted patents for research
purposes.5 Contrary to popular belief, researchers largely do not avoid
20. See Anna B. Laakmann, An Explicit Policy Lever for Patent Scope, 19 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 43, 44 (2012).
21. ld.
22. Id. (quoting ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL
THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 153 (2006)).
23. See Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257
(2007) (disputing the law and economics view to argue that positive externalities created by
patents can enhance public welfare).
24. Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IowA L. REv. 539, 541 (2009).
25. Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Do Patents Disclose Useful Information, 25 HAR. J.L. &
TECH. 545, 571 (2012).
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reading patents for fear of willful infringement liability.26 Most critically,
it is not necessarily the claimed inventions that researchers find useful in
reading patents; in fact, researchers complain that the inventions
themselves cannot be reproduced by reading the patent document.
27
Rather, a majority of researchers find useful information in patents
related to background technology, technical details, and other
nonclaimed information.28 This makes sense. Presumably if one wanted
to conduct research related to semiconductor fabrication, for example, or
perhaps even enter that market, the nonproprietary teachings contained in
the patent portfolios of Intel, Qualcomm, and Samsung would provide
valuable information regarding equipment, and processes used in the
industry. Accordingly, disclosure theory recognizes that in exchange for
the patent grant, society receives patent disclosures that contribute to
innovations and market entries unrelated to the claimed inventions.29
B. Commercialization Theory
Commercialization theorists maintain that the patent system should
encourage the full commercialization and marketing of products, and not
just new inventions.3" A tremendous amount of work and investment
must occur in order to turn a patented invention into a commercial
product that will directly benefit the public, including the development
and testing of working prototypes, product modifications and
improvements, market research and marketing, distribution, and so
forth.' These activities and investments are ideally a substantial part of
the consideration society receives in exchange for the patent, because
"absent consumable, commercial products incorporating this
information, patent law would provide little benefit to the public."32
Accordingly, despite commercialization theorists' quarrels with the
disclosure theory, both theories recognize the value of unclaimed
consideration.
The problem is that the majority of claimed inventions are not
commercialized, and rather often pose a barrier to the creation of
commercialized products-the very consideration that commercializa-
26. Id. at 579-81.
27. Ouellette, supra note 25, at 577-79.
28. Id. at 575-76.
29. See infra Part ll.B.
30. Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REv. 709, 711 (2012)
("Commercialization theory ... hypothesizes that we grant patents in order to encourage not
invention but product development.").
31. See, e.g., Cotropia, supra note 7, at 88-93; Sichelman, supra note 3, at 347-54.
32. Sichelman, supa note 3, at 354.
20151
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tion theorists believe society should receive in return for the patent
monopoly. In order to directly encourage product development,
commercialization theorists propose various radical reforms to the patent
system, such as the creation of "innovation warrants" and
"commercialization patents."" In light of the fact that such major
reforms are unlikely, and given the growing consensus in support of the
value of unclaimed consideration, this Article begins the task of
identifying modest, judge-made reforms that would encourage and
protect unclaimed consideration from the thicket of claimed inventions.4
C Prospect Theory
Prospect theorists maintain that broad, early patent rights should be
granted to inventors so that they might develop them as a miner develops
a prospect." This discourages or cuts short innovation races, which
prospect theorists argue are wasteful because they result in the
simultaneous, duplicative investigation of the same problems by multiple
investigators." The pioneer of prospect theory, Edmund W Kitch, has
argued that early, broad patent rights put "the patent owner in a position
to coordinate the search for technological and market enhancement of the
patent's value so that duplicative investments are not made, and so that
information is exchanged among the searchers."7
The premises and prescriptions of prospect theory are subject to
piercing criticism. As discussed below, innovation races are productive,
not wasteful; first claimants are not necessarily the best equipped to
coordinate the development of inventions into practical innovations, and
the early granting of patent rights results in inefficiencies, increased
litigation, and the underdevelopment of patented inventions.8
The primary purpose of this Article, however, is not to point out the
flaws of prospect theory or any of the other theories being discussed.
Rather, this Article argues that prospect theory agrees with the other
theories discussed in this Article on one critical point: a primary
33. See infra Part II.C.
34. See infra Part If.C.
35. See Edmund W Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. &
ECON. 265, 276 (1977) ("[A] patent 'prospect' increases the efficiency with which investment in
innovation can be managed.").
36. Id. Less traditional prospect theorists are more receptive to patent races. See, e.g.,
John F Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 439, 444-45 (2004)
(arguing that patent races cause inventors to works faster, which results in earlier patents that
expire and are thereby dedicated to the public earlier).
37. Kitch, supra note 35, at 276.
38. See infia Part ll.D.
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consideration society receives in exchange for the patent grant is
unclaimed consideration, not claimed inventions. In particular, prospect
theorists advance their prescriptions in order to achieve the development
of inventions into innovations for commercial or public use.39 Hence,
prospect theory too recognizes that in exchange for the patent grant,
society should receive something beyond the inventions claimed in a
patent."
D. Patent Race Theory
Patent race theory directly refutes prospect theory's hostility
towards innovation races by pointing out that the majority of inventions
are discovered, and innovations developed, only as the result of multiple,
competing researchers working simultaneously on the same problem.4'
Accordingly, many famous inventions would not exist absent an
innovation race to spur them on. Critical to this Article, however, is
patent race theory's recognition of the value of unclaimed consideration.
Researchers engaged in a patent race who fail to obtain the patent often
discover a different, beneficial invention in the process." Patent races
push researchers to work faster, resulting in the earlier entry of patented
inventions into the public domain and the earlier development of
cumulative improvements from others.43 Further, the pressure of a
perceived patent deadline may cause researchers to do better work.'
Accordingly, although patent race theory quarrels with disclosure theory,
commercialization theory, and prospect theory in other respects,5 it also
recognizes the value of unclaimed consideration as a primary benefit of
the patent grant.46
39. See, e.g., Yoram Barzel, Optimal Timing of Innovations, 50 REv. ECON. & STAT. 348,
349 (1968) ("The model is set to determine the date for which an innovation is socially optimal,
the date for which it maximizes profit for its owner."); Kitch, supra note 35, at 266 (arguing that
the prospecting nature of the patent system stimulates technological innovation which "can be
undertaken efficiently only if there is a system that tends to assure efficient allocation of the
resources among the prospects at an efficient rate and in an efficient amount").
40. See infra Part ll.D.
41. See Lemley, supra note 30, at 712-33.
42. JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 400 (1988) ("[T]he loser of
a patent race does not always lose everything; sometimes it comes up with a patent for another
product.... It would thus be desirable to formalize successive patent races."); see also Cotropia,
supra note 7, at 86 (citing Giovanni De Fraja, Strategic Spillovers in Patent Races, II INT'L J.
INDUS. ORG. 139, 140 (1993); Jennifer F Reinganum, A Dynamic Game of R andD." Patent
Protection and Competitive Behavior, 50 ECONOMETRICA 671, 671 (1982)).
43. Lemley, supm note 30, at 753.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 738-49.
46. See infra Part I1.E.
2015]
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. Signaling (or Portfolio) Theory
The portfolio theory of patent protection recognizes that a
company's patent portfolio can be used to signal information to investors
about the company."7 In such instances, it is not only (and perhaps not
even) the value of claimed inventions in the portfolio that are critical.
Rather, it is what the patents demonstrate about the company's technical
expertise and the resources the company invests into research and
development."8 Accordingly, patents serve primarily as conveyors of
information to facilitate efficient investment, innovation, and growth-
unclaimed effects unrelated to the claimed inventions."9
Accordingly, the various modem schools of patent scholarship
increasingly agree that unclaimed consideration is a substantial value that
society receives in exchange for the patent grant. It may equal or exceed
the benefit of the patented inventions themselves. Part III of this Article
begins by arguing that we should recognize this growing consensus view
and focus patent reform on fostering and protecting unclaimed
consideration from the encroachment of patent claims. However, we
need not do this by proposing radical modifications to the patent law that
are unlikely to be enacted and could disturb the innovation ecosystem in
unforeseen ways. Rather, protecting unclaimed consideration can be
achieved by modest, incremental judicial reform. When deciding close
issues, or resolving issues of first impression, judges should lean on the
side of protecting and promoting unclaimed consideration, rather than
strengthening the reach of patent rights under the belief that the sole
purpose of the patent system is to incentivize claimed inventions."
The Article then illustrates this point with a detailed case study of a
Federal Circuit decision, Siemens Medical Solutions USA, Inc. v Saint-
Gobain Ceramics & Plastics, Inc.5  In Siemens, the court found
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents by a product that was
separately patented as a nonobvious variation of the patent-in-suit.2 Part
III examines the patents at issue and the accused product, an improved
scintillator for medical imaging that was a tremendous commercial
47. See Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHi. L. REV. 625,646 (2002).
48. Id
49. See infia Part I I.E.
50. See infm Part III.A.
51. Siemens Med. Sols. USA, Inc. v. Saint-Gobain Ceramics & Plastics, Inc., 637 F3d
1269 (Fed. Cir. 2011), reh'g en banc denied, 647 E3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.
Ct. 2679 (May 29, 2012); see Holte, supra note 12, at 19-20 ("Case studies are an important part
of empirical research used to illustrate or disprove theories proposed in other analyses.").
52. Siemens, 637 F3d at 1283-84.
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success.53 The accused scintillator was precisely the type of unclaimed
consideration that society deserves to receive in exchange for the patent
grant. Yet, a divided panel of the Federal Circuit affirmed infringement
under the doctrine of equivalents and subsequently denied rehearing en
banc over vigorous dissents." The doctrine of equivalents must not be
used to ensnare nonobvious variations of claimed inventions because
such follow-on innovations are the very types of unclaimed consideration
the patent laws should foster and protect. The Article concludes by
arguing that the doctrine of equivalents is a particular threat to unclaimed
consideration to the extent it allows patents to ensnare anything more
than trivial modifications of the claimed inventions, as happened in
Siemens, and that the phenomenon of blocking patents does nothing to
assuage these concerns."
II. THE VALUE OF UNCLAIMED CONSIDERATION
A. Unclaimed Consideration in the Law
Academic theory aside, the law has long recognized the value of
unclaimed consideration received in exchange for patent grants. The
statutory scheme requires not only the development of a novel invention,
but also the disclosure of technical information in exchange for a valid
patent. Hence, in addition to the novelty and nonobviousness require-
ments of sections 102 and 103 of the United States Patent Act, the statute
also requires a written description of the invention in "full, clear, concise,
and exact terms," such that the invention is enabled.6 The Act further
requires the inventor to describe the best mode for carrying out the
invention.57
The Supreme Court has interpreted these and other provisions to
conclude that the statute seeks different types of consideration in
exchange for the patent monopoly. Hence, society exacts the benefit of a
novel invention in exchange for the patent.58 But an additional part of
"the quid pro quo is disclosure of a process or device in sufficient
detail."9 This is not only "to enable one skilled in the art to practice the
invention once the period of the monopoly has expired," but also "to
53. Seeinfra Part III.B.
54. Siemens, 637 E3d at 1291-93 (Prost, C.J., dissenting); Siemens, 647 F3d at 1378-80
(Dyk, J., dissenting, joined by Gajarsa, J. and Prost, J.); see infa Part III.C-E.
55. See infra Part III.E.
56. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-103, 112(a) (2012).
57. Id § 112(a).
58. Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1,23 (1829).
59. Universal Oil Prod. Co. v. Globe Oil & Ref. Co., 322 U.S. 471,484 (1944).
2015]
TUL. J TECH & 1NTELL. PROP.
warn the industry concerned of the precise scope of the monopoly
asserted," such that innovation can proceed around the patent claims.6"
The Supreme Court has explicitly recognized that a value of the patent
disclosure is that it facilitates further innovation unclaimed in the patent:
When a patent is granted and the information contained in it is circulated to
the general public and those especially skilled in the trade, such additions
to the general store of knowledge are of such importance to the public weal
that the Federal Government is willing to pay the high price of 17 years of
exclusive use for its disclosure, which disclosure, it is assumed, will
stimulate ideas of the eventual development of further significant advances
in the art."
And so the law anticipates the receipt of multiple forms of
consideration in exchange for the patent grant. In exchange for a limited
monopoly, society demands not only the value of the claimed inventions,
but also the stimulation of "further significant advances in the art"--in
other words, unclaimed consideration. But how does one weigh these
different types of consideration against the value of claimed inventions?
As the remainder of this Part concludes, scholars are reaching a
consensus that unclaimed consideration is of greater value than claimed
inventions.
B. Unclaimed Consideration as Recognized by Disclosure Theory
Disclosure theory readily lends itself to a thesis promoting the value
of unclaimed consideration. This is because disclosure theorists argue
that an important goal of the patent system is to spur the creation and
dissemination of the technical teachings contained in patents; not just the
teachings claimed as inventions, but also the information contained in the
patent specification that is not claimed as an invention. As Professor
Jeanne Fromer has argued, not only does disclosure "permit[s] society at
large to apply the information by freely making or using the patented
invention after the expiration of the patent," disclosure can also
"stimulate others to design around the invention or conceive of new
inventions-either by improving upon the invention or by being inspired
by it--even during the patent term."62
Indeed, researchers who consult patents in undertaking their
research primarily make use of patent disclosures in this second way.
Professor Lisa Larrimore Ouellette's survey of nanotechnologists finds
60. d
61. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470,481 (1974).
62. Fromer, supra note 24, at 548-49.
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that the 60% of researchers who find useful information in patent
literature consult patents for useful technical information, rather than in
preparation for practicing the claimed inventions:
[T]he respondents who had found useful information primarily cited
"useful technical detail" like "clever descriptions and useful recipes." For
example, one academic physicist wrote: "I will sometimes look at patents
to see how a particular device works. Almost always some piece of lab
equipment." A chemist who works in an academic laboratory and for a
startup wrote: 'Useful' doesn't mean 'insightful' or 'detailed' but it
certainly was useful. The data helped put the ideas and research in context
and offered some plausible views as to what we were seeing in our own
research." Another chemist, who works in industry, explained: "Patents
are a useful source of information on how others have approached
particular technical problems and can also help [keep] you from going
down a road that has already been travelled.""3
In short, it is not only (or not at all) the patented inventions that are
useful to researchers. Rather, it is the unclaimed technical descriptions,
which facilitate, inform, and put into perspective further research, which
lead to further innovations. Indeed, although a majority of Professor
Ouellette's respondents found patent documents useful in their research,
a majority also found that the actual invention disclosures were not
useful: "the majority of them believe that patents do not enable a skilled
researcher to reproduce the invention."'
These findings bolster the view that the production of patent
literature plays an important role in codifying industry knowledge that
would otherwise remain tacit, as Professor Dan L. Burk has argued.65
Certain useful industrial knowledge-for example, standard recipes,
machine settings, or protocols for semiconductor fabrication-might be
known in an industry, but never codified or indexed because it is simply
too costly.6 The patent system serves not only to spur the disclosure of
novel inventions, but also results in the codification of tacit industry
knowledge-prior art and industry standards against which the claimed
inventions must be described and measured. The information is codified
in uniform formats that "offer a considerable savings over having to
examine and interpret idiosyncratic technical documents from different
technology holders."67
63. Ouellette, supra note 25, at 575.
64. Id. at 578.
65. Dan L. Burk, The Role of Patent Law in Knowledge Codification, 23 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1009, 1017-27 (2008).
66. Id. at 1014.
67. Id. at 1020.
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The codification of tacit industry knowledge benefits society in
multiple ways, even if the knowledge is not novel or inventive. This
codified knowledge can evidence prior art, such that patent claims are
not given to old ideas.6" It can also result in further innovation because it
facilitates market entry by actors who can learn essential industry
knowledge that would remain tacit in the absence of patent disclosures.
Codification of tacit knowledge further spurs subsequent innovation by
allowing researchers to understand what is already known and avoid the
duplication of effort.
Despite this ability of patent disclosure to induce further
innovations, disclosure as a goal of patent policy has come under attack
by some scholars.69 One line of argument denigrates the importance of
disclosure with the supposition that researchers do not read patent
documents, either because they are afraid of willful infringement liability
or because patent documents do not contain useful information or are
poorly indexed." These assumptions turn out to be incorrect. Professor
Ouellette's study showed that 60% of nanotechnologists who consult the
patent literature in their research find useful technical information
therein.7' Even previous surveys relied upon by scholars to support the
notion that researchers do not read patents do not support such a
conclusion. Professor Ouellette noted that the 1994 Wesley Cohen
survey, upon which scholars have based the claim that scientists do not
read patents, in fact found that "49.1% of U.S. respondents indicated
patents were 'moderately' or 'very important as a source of
information[,] ... less than the 61.8% who said the same of publications
or the 51.3% for informal exchange, but still almost half the sample."72
Nor do researchers avoid reading patents out of a fear of willful
infringement liability." Such a fear would likely be misguided in light of
the Federal Circuit's new stringent test for willful infringement, which
allows any good faith theory of the noninfringement, invalidity, or
unenforceability of the patent to negate the intent element of willfulness
liability. " The notion that scientists avoid consulting patents because
68. Id. at 1024-25.
69. See, e.g., Alan J. Devlin, The Misunderstood Function of Disclosure in Patent Law,
23 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 401, 410-12 (2010); Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession i  Patent Law, 59
SMU L. REv. 123, 131-36 (2006).
70. See Devlin, supra note 69, at 403-04; Holbrook, supra note 69, at 146.
71. Ouellette, supra note 25, at 575.
72. Id. at 562-64.
73. See id at 579-81.
74. See In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding that in
order to prove willful infringement, the patent holder has to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the infringer acted despite an objectively high likelihood that its actions constituted
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they are poorly indexed may also be outdated given the ongoing
development of technology to index patents, such as Google Patents and
an improved USPTO website.75
The second argument against disclosure theory is that claimed
inventions inevitably would be publicly disclosed, even in the absence of
patent disclosure requirements.76 The argument is that most patented
inventions can be reverse engineered once they are commercialized. If a
patented invention was not self-disclosing, there would have been no
incentive to patent it because it could have been monopolized through
trade secret protection for an unlimited duration.77
This argument fails for several reasons. First, the majority of
patented inventions are never commercialized."8  Accordingly, the
majority of patented inventions are not available as commercial products,
and therefore cannot be discovered through reverse engineering. Such
inventions are only available in the published patent literature and would
never have been described and enabled absent the patent disclosure
requirements.79
Moreover, much of the information in patents that researchers find
useful is unclaimed technical information, as discussed above. Such
information is not necessarily obtainable through reverse engineering a
patented product. Much of this information would not be disclosed
absent patent disclosure quirements. As Professor Fromer concluded,
"[m]uch of the information contained in-or that ought to be in-patents
is not published elsewhere."8 This is because an inventor "will generally
not publish information about his invention until the associated patent
application becomes public."8' And because inventors have an incentive
to reveal no more information about their inventions than is required, the
disclosure requirements of the Patent Act ensure that "no other source
infringement and that this objectively high risk was either known or so obvious that it should have
been known to the accused infringer); see also HON. TIMOTHY B. DYK & SAMUEL E ERNST,
Patents, in BUSINESS AND COMMERCIAL LITIGATION IN FEDERAL COURTS § 86:32, at 997 (Robert
L. Haig ed., 3d ed. 2011) ("These are two very difficult things to prove."). In Cohesive Techs.,
Inc. v Waters Corp., 543 E3d 1351, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2008), the Federal Circuit affirmed a finding
of no willful infringement on the basis that the defendant's argument regarding the proper
construction of a claim term was not objectively reckless, even though the construction was
rejected by the district court and the Federal Circuit.
75. See Ouellette, supra note 25, at 574-75 (finding that the most common ways in which
researchers find patents are through searching the USPTO website and Google Patents).
76. See Devlin, supm note 69, at 411; Holbrook, supra note 69, at 132-35.
77. Devlin, supranote 69, at 417-18; Holbrook, supranote 69, at 132-35.
78. Sichelman, supra note 3, at 362-63.
79. Id at 363.
80. Fromer, supra note 24, at 554.
81. Id. at 554-55.
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will contain as much disclosure as the patent document."82 Moreover, as
discussed above, patent disclosure rules result in the disclosure of
information that would otherwise remain tacit, and result in such
information being codified and indexed in standard formats."
There is no doubt that patent law could be reformed to improve the
quality of patent disclosures as they are currently written.84 However,
disclosure as a goal of patent policy already appears to facilitate value in
the form of further innovations and technical information.
C Unclaimed Consideration as Recognized by Commercialization
Theory
Like disclosure theory, commercialization theory by its very nature
emphasizes the value of unclaimed consideration. This is because
commercialization theory stands for the proposition that the patent
system should encourage the full commercialization and marketing of
new products, and not just new inventions.85 According to commerciali-
zation theorists, the creation of a new invention is little more than the
first step in a process that may or may not lead to something far more
valuable to society: an actual commercial product or process. Ted
Sichelrnan wrote, "[a]lthough an important aim of patent law is to spur
the disclosure of new and nonobvious technical information-absent
consumable, commercial products incorporating this information, patent
law would provide little benefits to the public."86  Accordingly, the
primary consideration society should seek in exchange for granting the
patent monopoly are a whole host of activities beyond the mere
disclosure of a claimed invention. These activities include the
development of a working prototype, market testing and marketing,
distribution of the commercial product, product improvements, and so
forth." Most of this activity occurs long after the claimed invention is
82. 1d. at 555.
83. See Burk, supm note 65, at 1019-24. In addition, Jason Rantanen has forcefully
argued that patent protection facilitates "peripheral disclosure," which is "the non-patent sharing
of information by an inventor that would not occur in the absence of a patent system," such as
scientific publications and product marketing. Jason Rantanen, Peripheral Disclosure, 74 U. Pinr.
L. REv. 1, 16, 21, 27 (2012).
84. See Sean B. Seymore, The Teaching Function of Patents, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
621, 641-57 (2010) (proposing reforms to improve patent disclosures).
85. Lemley, supra note 30, at 711 ("Commercialization theory ... hypothesizes that we
grant patents in order to encourage not invention but product development.").
86. Sichelman, supra note 3, at 354.
87. Id. at 348-54 (describing the "lengthy process" of bringing a product to market,
involving many steps "which are fraught with uncertainty and great expense"); Cotropia, supra
note 7, at 89-93 (describing the process of developing a commercial product).
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disclosed; as Christopher Cotropia has pointed out: "There is an
enormous amount of technical and market information generated as
development proceeds towards the final goal of commercial sale ....
The process, hopefully results in a commercialized product that is
technologically feasible and best meets market demand.""
The problem, according to commercialization theory, is that the
patent system fails to directly encourage this valuable commercialization
activity." Patent laws do this in multiple ways. For example, there is no
requirement to make a working prototype (or an actual "reduction to
practice" to use the patent jargon) prior to receiving a patent.'
Accordingly, the law does not require patentees to take one of the very
first steps necessary to determine if an invention is actually marketable.9'
Patent laws further encourage and, indeed, require, the early filing of
patent applications, long before any commercialization and market
testing activity could determine whether the invention as claimed could
feasibly be incorporated into a commercially viable product.92
Accordingly, Cotropia has written about the "folly" of early patent filing,
because "the earlier in the development process a patent is filed, the less
available information there will be about the invention and, more
importantly, how the inventions will be used commercially."3
The result is the creation of a vast thicket of patents, the majority of
which are never commercialized, because at the time of filing, nobody
knows whether the claimed inventions would be feasible commercial
products.4 These patents that never see the light of day would not
necessarily be a problem if they remained dormant. Unfortunately, they
create a patent thicket that can impede commercialization, the very
88. Cotropia, supra note 7, at 88-89.
89. Sichelman, supra note 3, at 344 ("The upshot is that patent law confers direct
encouragement to inventors who create and disclose intangible specifications, but not necessarily
tangible products.").
90. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012) (requiring no actual reduction to practice in a patent
application); Seymore, supra note 84, at 628 ("In contrast to the norms of scientific research,
which focus on work actually performed, an inventor can obtain a patent without conducting a
single experiment.").
91. Seymore, supra note 84, at 628.
92. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012) (awarding patent protection to the "first to file" an
application); Cotropia, supra note 7, at 78-82 (discussing how the novelty provisions and the one-
year statutory bar of the 1952 Patent Act encourage and require early filing and the "first to file"
system of the America Invents Act magnifies these incentives).
93. Cotropia, supra note 7, at 88.
94. As pointed out above, the majority of patents are never commercialized. See
Sichelman, supra note 3, at 362-64.
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activity that commercialization theorists value.95 Scholars have demon-
strated this phenomenon in various industries, wherein a maze of claimed
inventions must be navigated in order produce a commercial product.96
Companies must expend tremendous resources to field an onslaught of
demand letters from numerous patent holders. As one treatise
recognizes:
Due to the increasing importance of patents and patent infringement
litigation, it has become a fact of life for technology companies that they
will receive multiple notice letters from patent-holders on a regular basis.
In the current environment, a major task for in-house counsel in I.P
departments is to field these demand letters, make an assessment of which
demand letters are frivolous or intended for harassment, and determine
which raise valid infringement concerns. This work involves complicated
investigations into the accused technology, the proper interpretation of the
patent claims, and the existence of potentially invalidating prior art.97
This all amounts to a tax on innovation, particularly where the asserted
patents themselves are never commercialized for the benefit of the
public. Further, because the majority of patents are not commercialized,98
and the majority of patent litigation is brought by nonpracticing entities,"
this is more often than not the case. This is a particular problem in
complex industries such as the high-tech industry, where commercial
products are potentially covered by hundreds or thousands of patents.'"
Commercialization theory proposes radical solutions to these
problems, calling for reforms to the patent system that directly reward
commercialization. William Kingston has proposed an "innovation
warrant" with the purpose of "protecting innovation directly, instead of
indirectly, through whatever protection a patent is able to give to its
related invention."'"' Sichelman has proposed the creation of a new type
of patent, a "commercialization patent," which would be "granted in
95. Cotropia, supra note 7, at 112 ("This underdevelopment of patented invention, for the
reasons articulated, can have serious consequences because it can only hamper, as opposed to
promote, technological progress.").
96. Seecases cited supranote 6.
97. Dyk & Ernst, supra note 74, § 86:7, at 954.
98. Sichelman, supra note 3, at 362-64.
99. Feldman, Ewing & Jeruss, supra note 9, at 16.
100. See William Kingston, Innovation Needs Patents Reform, 30 RES. POL'Y 403, 407-08
(2001) ("In contrast to simple technologies such as chemicals, for which they are indispensable,
patents are inherently disadvantageous for complex technologies. The primary reason is that if
competing firms hold patents on different components of a complex technology, and they fail to
cross-license them (which can happen from many causes, not all of them rational) development in
an entire industry can be slowed down or even rendered impossible.").
101. Id at 416.
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exchange for a commitment to commercialize a product not available in
the marketplace.'' 2 Cotropia has called for a new requirement that all
patent applicants reduce their inventions to actual practice prior to
patenting.'°3 Other scholars have proposed many other such radical
reforms to the patent system to address the perceived problem of
undercommercialization of patented inventions."
Although these proposals are laudable in their intentions, they all
suffer from one particular defect: such radical reforms of the Patent Act
are highly unlikely ever to occur. After all, the America Invents Act, was
the first major patent law bill to be passed since the Patent Act in 1952,
and it labored through Congress for nearly six years.0 5  Although
legislation to tackle the problem of "patent trolls" is currently making its
way through Congress, it does not contain reforms of this radical nature.
It is therefore highly unlikely that such major reforms to the very nature
of the patent system as described above would ever become law.
Moreover, even if such reforms were enacted, they may disturb the
innovation ecosystem in unforeseen ways. For example, a commerciali-
zation requirement may stifle the ability of poorly funded inventors to
obtain a patent.
Rather than proposing radical reform, this Article begins the task of
proposing ways in which the courts can interpret the law that will attempt
to protect this unclaimed consideration from the thicket of claimed
inventions. '
Commercialization scholars (as well as theorists in other schools)
often quarrel with disclosure theory.'7 However, commercialization
theory and modem disclosure theory appear to agree that a substantial
return society should receive in exchange for the patent grant is
unclaimed consideration. Accordingly, as the courts develop patent law
102. Sichelman, supra note 3, at 345.
103. Cotropia, supra note 7, at 119-20.
104. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, The Danger of Underdeveloped Patent Prospects, 92
COPNELL L. REV. 1065, 1109-20 (2007) (proposing patent term extensions and auctions for
rewarding ownership of the extended patent rights); Michael Abramowicz & John Duffy,
Intellectual Property for Market Experimentation, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 337, 401-02 (2008)
(proposing narrower claim interpretations, reduced status as prior art, and higher validity bars for
uncommercialized patents).
105. Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act 21 FED.
CIR. B.J. 435,435-36 (2011).
106. See infIa Part Ill.
107. See, e.g., Sichelman, supra note 3, at 377-78 (criticizing disclosure theory on the
basis that "scientists and engineers never read patents" and "technical knowledge put to no use is
not worth much"); see also, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 69-70, 76-77.
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incrementally, they should have in mind this consensus view that we
must protect and encourage unclaimed consideration. 1
08
D Unclaimed Consideration as a Goal ofProspect Theory
If researchers across a particular industry recognize a problem in
the art, they may engage in an innovation race, furiously investigating the
problem in order to be the first to achieve a solution.'9 As previously
stated prospect theorists view races to obtain the same innovation as
wasteful-that it is inefficient for researchers in separate labs to
simultaneously conduct the same research."' Edmund Kitch has written
that once a problem has been investigated by one firm, "[s]ubsequent
investigation of the same prospect by other firms can neither build on the
knowledge obtained by the first searcher nor determine the efficient level
and strategy of search based upon his failure.""' He was inspired by
Yoram Barzel's idea that innovation races are a social ill." 2  Kitch's
solution to the problem was that broad and early prospects should be
granted to the first claimant, before too much wasteful, duplicative
research and investment is expended by others: "This puts the patent
owner in a position to coordinate the search for technological and market
enhancement of the patent's value so that duplicative investments are not
made and so that information is exchanged among the searchers.""'3
Kitch's prescription for the perceived innovation race is problematic
for many reasons. First, innovation races are not wasteful because they
result in various researchers coming up with multifarious solutions and
other innovations beyond the claims of the so-called winner of the patent
108. See infa Part III.A.
109. In the context of prospect theory, I refer to this as an innovation race, rather than a
patent race, because, as the discussion below reveals, prospect theorists maintain that the race to
achieve and release an innovation is wasteful, and should be cut off by the awarding of a patent to
the first "prospector," who can then coordinate the development of the invention into an
innovation. For the distinction between an "invention" and an "innovation," see supra note 5 and
accompanying text.
110. See Kitch, supra note 35, at 276.
111. Id.
112. Id. (discussing Barzel, supa note 39, at 351-52). However, Barzel explicitly
disclaimed that innovation races were wasteful because of the duplication of efforts; instead, he
considered them wasteful because they resulted in the premature development of innovations:
"As considered here, the basic wasteful effect of competition lies not in duplicating the use of
resources but in using these resources prematurely, when they would have earned a higher return
elsewhere in the economy." Barzel, supra note 39, at 352.
113. Kitch, supra note 35, at 276. Indeed, Kitch recognized that the patent law already
encourages (and even requires) inventors to file patent applications early in the innovation
process. Id at 269.
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race.'4 Moreover, inventors (or, rather, first claimants) are often not the
best actors to coordinate the development of an invention into a
marketable innovation."5  Some of the evidence for this is that most
claimed inventions are never commercialized or licensed."6 Finally, as
Chris Cotropia has argued, granting patent rights early is a "folly"
because it results in "too many patent applications, too many patents,
underdevelopment of patented technology, increased assertion of patent
rights, and fuzzy patent boundaries," among other problems.'7
But what is pertinent to this Article is where prospect theory agrees
with the other theories advanced in this paper: that the claimed
inventions are not the principal valuable consideration we seek in
exchange for the patent grant. Rather, prospect theorists seek efficient
coordination of innovation, the development of those inventions into
something more than is claimed-a developed prospect. Accordingly,
Kitch's acknowledged influence (Barzel),"' wrote that his "model is set
to determine the date for which an innovation is socially optimal, the date
for which it maximizes profit for its owner, and its net contribution under
either situation to the income (or wealth) of society.""' 9 Barzel went on to
consider the optimal time for developing an invention for "commercial
use," which requires substantial work and investment.'2"
Kitch advocates giving an early prospect to the first inventor, so that
this first claimant has the incentive and ability to coordinate the
development of that invention into a commercial product for the benefit
of the public. The early and broad claim to a patented invention is not
important in and of itself, but because "extensive development is
required before any commercial application is possible-for example the
laser, the transistor, nylon, and xerography."'2' Accordingly, patent claims
are necessary so that "the patent owner has an incentive to make
investments to maximize the value of the patent without fear that the
fruits of the investment will produce unpatentable information
appropriable by competitors."' '22 Furthermore, Kitch has argued that
these early patent rights allow first claimants to bring information about
114. See infra Part II.E (discussing patent race theory).
115. Lemley, supra note 30, at 7404 1.
116. Sichelman, supm note 3, at 362-64.
117. Cotropia, supra note 7, at 65.
118. See Kitch, supm note 35, at 265 ("These ideas first crystallized in response to
Barzel's essay, 'The Optimal Timing of Innovations."').
119. Barzel, supra note 39, at 349 (emphasis added).
120. Id. at 348-49.
121. Kitch, supr note 35, at 276.
122. Id.
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the patented product to the public without fear of appropriation and
allows the inventor to coordinate the development of the innovation
without wasteful duplication of resources.'23
In short, as with the other theories discussed, prospect theory is
concerned with society receiving more than just a claimed invention,
which may remain undeveloped. Prospect heory too is concerned with
society's receipt of unclaimed consideration: a commercial product that
the public uses, developed without the wasteful duplication of resources.
Despite its misguided prescriptions, the goals of prospect theory counsel
us to promote unclaimed consideration.
E Unclaimed Consideration as a Goal offPatent Race Theory
Patent race theorists challenge prospect theory's notion that patent
(or innovation) races are wasteful by arguing that the patent race may
result in benefits to society beyond the inventions claimed in patents.
The researchers engaged in the patent race who fail to obtain the patent
may in the process discover different, beneficial innovations.'2" As Jean
Tirole has pointed out
[T]he loser of a patent race does not always lose everything; sometimes it
comes up with a patent for another product (or else with more experience
for the next patent race). Furthermore, monopolies created by patents are
temporary, even with strict patent protection. New technologies are
continuously invented to replace old ones.1
25
Indeed, Tirole thought that patent races had such potential benefit for





Mark Lemley developed the patent race theory further by
establishing that the great majority of innovations (even supposedly
pioneering inventions such as the telegraph, the telephone, and the
television) were the result of simultaneous development by researchers
engaged in a patent race.' For example, Lemley discussed Thomas
Edison and the development of the light bulb. Edison introduced the
improvement of a carbonized bamboo filament, which had a higher
resistance to electricity than previous filaments. 8 However, Willia E.
123. Id. at 276-77.
124. Tirole, supra note 42, at 400.
125. Id at 400.
126. Id
127. Lemley, supra note 30, at 749-60.




Sawyer and Albon Man (who sued Edison's licensees for patent
infringement) had previously discovered that some sort of carbonized
material (paper or wood) would work best as a filament, ,29 and various
types of incandescent lights had been developed by others around the
world over many years.'3° Accordingly, Edison's innovation, the perfected
light bulb with the use of a bamboo filament, would not have been
developed absent a patent race.'3' Contrary to prospect theory, if an early,
broad prospect had been given to Sir Humphrey Davey, an early
investigator of arc lighting,'32 such that Davey could make the
investments and research to perfect the innovation, it likely would not
have resulted in the Edison light bulb. Even a broad prospect to Sawyer
and Man would not likely have resulted in the perfected light bulb. This
is because Edison and his team conducted extensive research,
experimenting with bamboos from the Amazon and Japan, before
finding a bamboo that resulted in an improvement over the many earlier
innovations.' Rather than wasteful or duplicative, patent races are
necessary to innovation, because "[i]nvention appears in significant part
to be a social, not an individual, phenomenon."'
34
However, patent races do not merely result in the development of
some final, claimed invention, such as the perfected light bulb. Critical
to this Article, patent race theory recognizes the value of unclaimed
consideration resulting from patent races. For example, patent races
induce researchers to work faster, resulting in earlier inventions and the
earlier expiration of patents.'35 Patent races induce a multitude of
different solutions, reached by different researchers,'36 an unclaimed
benefit that goes beyond the value of particular patented inventions. And
finally, "inventors may work better when they are under some deadline
pressure."''
Accordingly, although patent race theory: (1) refutes prospect
theory (because prospect theory finds patent races wasteful); (2) quarrels
129. Cons. Elec. Light Co., 159 U.S. at 467-68.
130. Id. at 471 ("For many years prior to 1880, experiments had been made by a large
number of persons, in various countries, with a view to the production of an incandescent light
which could be made available for domestic purposes, and could compete with gas in the matter
of expense."); Lemley, supra note 30 at 722.
131. Lemley, supra note 30, at 722.
132. Id. (citing ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW &
POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 269 (4th ed. 2007)).
133. Id. at 722; Consol. Elec. Light Co., 159 U.S. at 472-73.
134. Lemley, supra note 30, at 711.
135. Id. at 753 (citing Duffy, supra note 36, at 444-45).
136. Id.; see alsoTIROLE, supra note 42, at 400.
137. Lemley, supra note 30, at 754.
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with commercialization theory (because, inter alia, inventors are not
good commercializers); and (3) takes issue with disclosure theory (under
the misapprehension that investigators do not read patents);'38 in fact,
patent race theory shares a common understanding with all of these other
theories. All of these theories appear to recognize that the primary
consideration society receives from the patent grant is unclaimed
consideration, and not the actual inventions that are disclosed to the
public.
E Unclaimed Consideration as Recognized by Signaling (or
Portfolio) Theory
According to the signaling (or portfolio) theory of patent protection,
inventors and companies seek patents not only (or maybe not even)
because of the right of exclusion they provide. Rather, patents, and in
particular patent portfolios, convey information about the companies
who own the patents.3' Clarisa Long has argued that it is a "simple
view" of patent protection to believe that inventors disclose their
inventions in patents only reluctantly to obtain the reward of a patent
monopoly.'° In fact, companies pursue patents because they are a
credible and efficient way of publicizing information about the
company."' Patents convey a wealth of information about the company
to potential investors above and beyond the particulars of any claimed
invention.
Patents signal information about a company within the patent
document itself about the lines of research the patentee firm is
undertaking and the research and prior art of other companies that the
patentee firm criticizes or recommends.'2 However, patents also signal
information unrelated to the details of the claims and specification of the
patent document. Patents signal that companies have sufficient resources
to expend on research and development and the expense of prosecuting
patents.143 Patents also signal that a firm is willing to stand behind its
research and assertions because they are written under the duty of candor
to the USPTO.'" In other words, patents are not mere puffery. Lemley
points out that "[v]enture capitalists use client patents (or more likely,
138. Id. at 738-49.
139. Holbrook, supra note 69, at 137.
140. Long, supra note 47, at 631-32.
141. Id at 636.
142. Id. at 647.
143. Id
144. Id. at 649.
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patent applications) as evidence that the company is well managed, is at a
certain stage in development, and has defined and carved out a market
niche."'45 According to the portfolio aspect of signaling theory, it is the
number of patents a company owns that is of primary importance; far
more important than the details of any particular claimed invention
within that portfolio, because it would be highly inefficient for investors
to assess each individual patent in a portfolio even were it possible to
assess the value of a claimed invention merely by reading the patent
document.'46
In short, signaling theory maintains that the private value of patents
is that they are a means of signaling information about their owners.'7
However, signaling theory also recognizes that the public value of patents
is that it facilitates such signaling. This is because patent signals are an
efficient way for investors to obtain information about a company at a
low cost.'48 It is more efficient for patentee firms to gather and present
information about the firm in documents blessed as credible by the
federal government than it is for investors to gather and verify this
information themselves.'9 This is particularly true with respect to private
equity firms, which are not required to submit Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) disclosures.'50 Patents are the SEC disclosures for
start-ups.'
Accordingly, despite their potential to provide firms with the
distorted incentive to obtain exclusionary rights, patent signals benefit
society by reducing information costs and thereby render investing more
efficient and informed with credible information. 2 This signaling
function and the information efficiencies it creates for investing is a form
of unclaimed consideration that society receives in exchange for the
patent grant. Signaling theory quarrels with the other theories of patent
protection for failing to explore the reasons patentees obtain patents and
145. Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1495,
1505-06 (2001).
146. Holbrook, supa note 69, at 138 ("The disclosure of any single patent is likely
irrelevant in market signaling theory because evaluating the contents of the patent for accuracy
would greatly increase costs, undermining the efficiency gains of the signal.").
147. Long, supra note 47, at 647 ("Even if patents conferred no protection, firms might
find it desirable to obtain them as a means of credibly advertising their inventions.").
148. Id. at 644.
149. /d. at 645.
150. Seeidat67l.
151. Indeed, even publicly traded companies report information regarding their patents to
the SEC for the benefit of investors. See, e.g., SEC Form 20F, at 11, 13, 16.
152. Long, supra note 47, at 676.
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for assuming it is solely to obtain the exclusionary right.'53 However,
signaling theory agrees with all of the theories discussed above in its
recognition that a substantial value society receives from patents is
wholly unrelated to the inventions claimed in those patents. Patents
primarily signal information about companies, a form of unclaimed
consideration. As such, the conclusion to be drawn from this shared
insight is the same: if the primary value received in exchange for the
patent grant is not claimed inventions, then we must assure that claimed
inventions do not interfere with the value of unclaimed consideration.
III. MODEST JUDICIAL REFORM TO PROTECT UNCLAIMED
CONSIDERATION
A. Judicial Reform and the Consensus on Unclaimed Consideration
Thus far, this Article has argued that there is a fundamental and
growing consensus among patent theorists: that a substantial or even
primary consideration society receives for the patent grant is unclaimed
consideration, not claimed inventions, which are usually never commer-
cialized or licensed in any event. In light of this common understanding,
why are patent theorists continually locked in disagreement over how the
patent law should foster innovation? Why are we laboring under a
"stalemate of empirical intuitions," as one scholar puts it? '54
It would be far more practical for patent theorists to acknowledge
their basic core of agreement-the value of unclaimed consideration-
and seek reforms that protect and encourage this unclaimed
consideration. These need not be radical reforms, such as patent
extension auctions, commercialization patents, the elimination of patents,
or other such revolutions that are highly unlikely to be enacted and which
could disturb the innovation ecosystem in unforeseen ways. Rather,
courts, in evolving the law and deciding close questions, should always
have in mind the importance of protecting unclaimed consideration.
Where possible, courts should lean on the side of guarding unclaimed
consideration from the thicket of patent claims that threatens it. In doing
so, we can increase the likelihood that society receives the valuable
unclaimed consideration it deserves in exchange for the patent grant.
This Part provides an example of how the courts should protect
unclaimed consideration through the vehicle of a case study of Siemens
153. ld. at 675.
154. Laakmann, supra note 21, at 44 (quoting Vermeule, supra note 22, at 153).
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Medical Solutions USA, Inc. v Saint-Gobain Ceramics & Plastics, Inc.55
In Siemens, the court affirmed infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents by a product that was separately patented as a nonobvious
variation of the patent-in-suit.'56 The court reached this conclusion even
though the patent office had considered the asserted patent as prior art
during prosecution of the accused infringer's patent, and had determined
that the accused infringer's patent was nonobvious in light of the asserted
patent.'57 The panel opinion and the subsequent denial of rehearing en
banc were each issued over a vigorous dissent,"8 and with good reason.
The doctrine of equivalents must not be used to ensnare nonobvious
variations of claimed inventions. Such follow-on innovations are the
very types of unclaimed consideration received by society in exchange
for the patent grant hat should be fostered and protected.
B. A Tale of Two Patents
In the Siemens case, Siemens sued Saint-Gobain Ceramics &
Plastics for the alleged infringement of U.S. Patent No. 4,958,080, ('080
patent) that claims a "Lutetium Orthosilicate Single Crystal Scintillator
Detector."'5 9 The patent relates to an improvement in a type of nuclear
medical imaging called positron emission tomography (PET).'60 PET
scanners detect gamma rays produced by a radioisotope that is
administered to a patient and convert these gamma rays into photons of
visible light, which are then used to create a three-dimensional image of
the patient.6' The scanner converts the photons to rays of visible light by
passing them through a scintillator crystal, which "is a substance that
absorbs high energy radiation and, in response, fluoresces photons at a
specific, longer wavelength, releasing the previously absorbed energy."
' 62
The inventor of the '080 patent did not, of course, invent positron
emission tomography or the idea that gamma rays can be converted to
visible light to create three dimensional images or even that this should
155. Siemens Med. Sols. USA, Inc. v. Saint-Gobain Ceramics & Plastics, Inc., 637 F.3d
1269 (Fed. Cir. 2011), reh'g en banc deniec4 647 E3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. denieg 132 S.
Ct. 2679 (May 29, 2012).
156. Id. at 1283-84.
157. Id. at 1284.
158. [d. at 1291-93 (Prost, C.J., dissenting); Siemens, 647 E3d at 1378-80 (Dyk, J.,
dissenting, joined by Gajarsa & Prost, JJ.).
159. U.S. Patent No. 4,958,080 (filed Aug. 4, 1989) [hereinafter '080 Patent].
160. Siemens Med. Solutions USA, Inc. v. Saint-Gobain Ceramics & Plastics, Inc., 615 F.
Supp. 2d 304, 307 (D. Del. 2009) (granting in part and denying in part judgment as a matter of
law).
161. Id
162. Id. at 307 n.1.
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be done by passing the gamma rays through a scintillator.'63 Rather, the
'080 patent claims a gamma ray or x-ray detector using a particular type
of single crystal scintillator among many other single crystal scintillators
already known in the art." The patent concedes that "[a] well-known
form of detector for gamma rays... employs a transparent single crystal,
known as a scintillator, which responds to impinging radiation to emit
light pulses."'' 5  It further concedes that there are a wealth of single
crystal scintillators known in the art, including thallium-doped sodium
iodide, cesium iodide, bismuth germinate, naphthalene, anthracene, and
stilbene.'66 All of these scintillators have problems, according to the
patentee, such as "low radiation detection efficiency, slow scintillation
decay, and large and persistent afterglow."'67 But the '080 patent was not
the first patent to solve these problems either. Rather, the patentee
observed that "[m]ore recently, a gamma ray detector employing a
scintillator formed of a single crystal of cerium-activated gadolinium
orthosilicate (GSO) has been proposed"; these GSO scintillators solve
many of the problems with previous scintillators, and were patented by
another person for use in positron computed tomography.'68 What the
patentee and his co-workers discovered was the use of a GSO scintillator
"as a gamma ray detector in the hostile conditions of borehole logging.'69
However, the patent does not claim that invention either; it is claimed in a
different patent filed by the patentee and his co-workers that was not at
issue in the suit.' Rather, the patent was conceived when the inventor,
building on all of the above knowledge and innovations, "consider[ed]
other rare earth compounds as possible scintillators for gamma ray (and
like) detection."'7 ' As a result of this research, the patent discloses and
claims the use of yet one more type of scintillator, a single crystal of
cerium-activated lutetium oxyorthosilicate,'2 or as the district court
called it, an "LSO crystal."
I describe the history and invention of the '080 Patent in this way
not to belittle its claimed invention, but rather to emphasize the
incremental nature of innovation. The patent was not a "pioneering"
163. '080 Patent, supra note 159.
164. Idat3:10-14&claiml.
165. Id. at 1:12-15.
166. Id. at 1:24-39.
167. Id. at 1:40-63.
168. Id. at 1:64-2:18 ("Such a GSO scintillator is describe in U.S. Pat. No. 4,647,781,
issued Mar. 3, 1987, for use in positron computed tomography.").
169. Id. at 2:18-20.
170. Id. at 2:20-29.
171. Id. at 2:31-33.
172. Id. at3:10-15&cl. 1.
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invention, if such a thing indeed exists, but an incremental improvement
over the prior art comprising the use of a new type of scintillator after
many others had been used effectively before.
The accused product in the Siemens case also represented a further,
incremental step in the art. Saint-Gobain's accused scintillator comprised
a single crystal of lutetium yttrium orthosilicate.'7' In other words, "[i]n
contrast to the LSO crystals of the '080 patent, which contain only
lutetium, defendant's LYSO crystals represent a 10% (by mole)
substitution of the element yttrium for lutetium."' ' There is no need to
wonder if it were a minor or obvious advance for the defendant to
substitute yttrium for lutetium because the USPTO already answered that
question; the USPTO decided that the defendant's cintillator was a
separately patentable, nonobvious invention after considering the '080
patent as prior art."5 The accused product was claimed by a patent
licensed by Saint-Gobain, U.S. Patent No. 6,624,420 ('420 patent). The
'420 patent claimed "[a] scintillator detector for high energy radiation
comprising: a monocrystalline structure of cerium doped lutetium
yttrium orthosilicate.'' 6 The inventors of the '420 patent disclosed to the
USPTO that the single crystal lutetium orthosilicate scintillator had
already been invented and claimed by the '080 patent.' However, they
pointed out that "the lutetium element of the crystal contains a trace
amount of a natural long decay radioactive isotope," which causes
problems with the use of that scintillator under certain conditions.'
Accordingly, the patent inventors offered an incremental improvement,
similar to the incremental improvement offered by the inventor of the
'080 patent. The scintillator claimed in the '420 patent substitutes
yttrium for much of the lutetium claimed by the '080 patent.' Critically,
during the prosecution of the '420 patent, the USPTO considered the
prior art '080 patent and determined that the '420 patent was a separately
patentable invention that would not have been obvious to one of ordinary
skill in the art in light of the '080 patent.'80
173. Siemens Med. Sols. USA, Inc. v. Saint-Gobain Ceramics & Plastics, Inc., 615 E
Supp. 2d 304, 307 (D. Del. 2009).
174. Id
175. U.S. Patent No. 6,624,420 (filed Feb. 17, 2000) [hereinafter '420 Patent].
176. Id. at cl. I (emphasis added).
177. Id. at "References Cited" & 2:28-44.
178. Id. at 2:40-60.
179. Id at 3:34-36.
180. Siemens Med. Sols. USA, Inc. v. Saint-Gobain Ceramics & Plastics, Inc., No. 07-
190-SLR, 2008 WL 114361 (D. Del. Jan. 8, 2008) (denying preliminary injunction). Siemens did
not challenge the USPTO's conclusion that the '420 patent claimed a nonobvious, separately
patentable invention in the court proceedings. Siemens Med. Sols. USA, Inc. v. Saint-Gobain
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Perhaps most importantly for the purpose of this Article, the
accused Saint-Gobain product was a commercially successful follow-on
innovation to the '080 patent that was appreciated by the public. Even
the Federal Circuit panel majority that later affirmed Saint-Gobain's
infringement admitted to "the commercial success of [Saint-Gobain's]
10% Y LYSO crystals."'8' As a commercially successful follow-on
innovation that did not literally infringe the '080 patent, the Saint-Gobain
scintillator was the very type of unclaimed consideration society
deserved to receive in exchange for granting the '080 patent monopoly.
C. The Siemens District Court Proceedings
Siemens sued Saint-Gobain and moved for a preliminary injunction
to prohibit Saint-Gobain from selling its LYSO scintillator pending
trial.'82 Because the Saint-Gobain scintillator substituted yttrium for
much of the lutetium claimed by Siemens's '080 patent, Siemens
conceded that there could be no literal infringement.'83 Accordingly, the
issue was whether Saint-Gobain was likely to prevail in proving that the
Saint-Gobain scintillator infringed under the doctrine of equivalents.'4
The doctrine of equivalents allows patent holders to prove accused
products infringe a claim even if they do not meet each of the claim
limitations defining the invention.'5 In theory, the doctrine of equiva-
lents should capture only "insubstantial changes and substitutions ...
which, though adding nothing, would be enough to take the copied
matter outside the claim, and hence outside the reach of law."'86
Prior to the Siemens case, the Federal Circuit had not directly
considered whether an accused product that was separately patented as
nonobvious in light of the asserted patent could nonetheless be proven to
infringe under the doctrine of equivalents. In other words, could an
adjudged nonobvious variation of a patented invention nonetheless be
nothing more than an "insubstantial change" over the first invention and
equivalently infringe the first patent? In one of its Festo decisions, the
court stated:
Ceramics & Plastics, Inc., 637 F3d 1269, 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ("Siemens ... stopped short of
directly challenging the validity of the '420 Patent." (internal citations omitted)).
181. Siemens, 637 F3d at 1282.
182. Siemens, 2008 WL 114361, at *1.
183. ld. at *3 n.7.
184. Id. at *3.
185. Id.
186. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950).
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We have not directly decided whether a device-novel and separately
patentable because of the incorporation of an equivalent feature-may be
captured by the doctrine of equivalents, although we have held that when a
device that incorporates the purported equivalent is in fact the subject of a
separate patent, a finding of equivalency, while perhaps not necessarily
legally foreclosed, is at least considerably more difficult to make out. But
there is a strong argument that an equivalent cannot be both non-obvious
and insubstantial. 1
87
The district court considered this Federal Circuit dictum and denied
Siemen's motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that Siemens had
not established a likelihood of success on the merits of proving
equivalent infringement. Because the Saint-Gobain scintillator was
deemed nonobvious by the USPTO in light of the asserted '080 patent,
the district court concluded that Saint-Gobain "ha[d] a strong argument
that its LYSO [was] both novel (nonobvious) and substantially different
from [Siemen's claimed] LSO.""'
Eight months later, however, a jury found that Saint-Gobain's
scintillator did infringe the '080 patent under the doctrine of equivalents
and awarded Siemens $52.3 million in damages.'89 Saint-Gobain moved
for a new trial on the finding of equivalent infringement.'9" Among
Saint-Gobain's arguments was that its crystal could not simultaneously
be separately patentable as nonobvious over the asserted patent and also
187. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 493 F.3d 1368, 1379-80 (Fed.
Cir. 2007); see also Hoganas AB v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 9 E3d 948, 954 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (finding
no equivalent infringement) ("[T]he USPTO must have considered the accused product to be
nonobvious with respect to the patented composition. Accordingly, the issuance of that patent is
relevant to the equivalence issue."); Zygo Corp. v. Wyko Corp., 79 E3d 1563, 1570 (Fed. Cir.
1996) (["The accused patented device is] presumed nonobvious ... [and] [t]he nonobviousness
... is relevant to the issue of whether the change therein is substantial"); Roton Barrier, Inc. v.
Stanley Works, 79 F.3d 1112, 1128 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (Nies, J., additional views) ("A substitution in
a patented invention cannot be both nonobvious and insubstantial."). But see Hoechst Celanese
Corp. v. BP Chems. Ltd., 78 F.3d 1575, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (["In a case finding literal
infringement] [t]he fact of separate patentability presents no legal or evidentiary presumption of
noninfringement and, in this case, does not outweigh the substantial evidence supporting the jury
verdict of infringement"); Glaxo Wellcome, Inc. v. Andrx Pharm., Inc., 344 E3d 1226, 1233 (Fed.
Cir. 2003) ("Although [separate patentability] may be weighed by the district court, particularly if
there is an issue of 'insubstantial' change with respect to equivalency, separate patentability does
not automatically negate infringement."); Nat'l Presto Indus., Inc. v. W. Bend Co., 76 E3d 1185,
1191-92 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ("Improvements or modifications may indeed be separately patentable if
the requirements of patentability are met, yet the device may or may not avoid infringement of the
prior patent.").
188. Siemens, 2008 WL 114361, at *6.
189. Siemens Med. Sols. USA, Inc. v. Saint-Gobain Ceramics & Plastics, Inc., 615 F.
Supp. 2d 304, 307 (D. Del. 2009).
190. Id.
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infringe that patent under the doctrine of equivalents.'9 ' At the very least,
Saint-Gobain argued, "[Siemens] was required to prove that its 10% Y
LYSO crystals are insubstantially different from the '080 patent claims
under the higher 'clear and convincing' standard of proof""'2 The district
court declined to decide these legal questions because they had never
been decided by the Federal Circuit:
Defendant freely admits that it cannot cite a case requiring infringement o
be proven by clear and convincing evidence; defendant seeks Federal
Circuit review of its argument as a matter of first impression. The court
finds defendant's position untenable and declines to be the first (and only)
court to depart from an extended history of patent infringement
jurisprudence applying the preponderance of the evidence standard.'93
Accordingly, the district court denied Saint-Gobain's request for
a new trial.'94
The court's decision to deny Saint-Gobain a new trial on equivalent
infringement, even after it had previously denied Siemens a preliminary
injunction for equivalent infringement, necessarily hinged on the
different standards of review governing the two motions. On the
preliminary injunction motion, Siemens had the burden of proving that it
was likely to succeed on the merits of its claim that Saint-Gobain
equivalently infringed the '080 patent."' Because this standard was more
favorable to Saint-Gobain, the Federal Circuit's dictum counseling
against equivalent infringement in these circumstances tipped the scale in
Saint-Gobain's favor: "As the Federal Circuit has noted, defendant has a
'strong argument' that its LYSO is both novel (non-obvious) and
substantially different from LSO."'' 6 However, with a jury verdict of
equivalent infringement, the odds of Saint-Gobain obtaining a new trial
were very slim. The district court would only grant a new trial if the jury
instructions on equivalent infringement "result[ed] in a miscarriage of
justice warranting a new trial."'9 7 Favorable dictum from the Federal
Circuit on an issue that had never been decided was insufficient for
Saint-Gobain to meet such a burden in the district court.9 As the court




195. Siemens Med. Sols. USA, Inc., v. Saint-Gobain Ceramics & Plastics, Inc., No. 07-
190-SLR, 2008 WL 114361, at *3 (D. Del. Jan. 8, 2008).
196. Id at *5.




noted, "defendant seeks Federal Circuit review of its argument as a
matter of first impression."'99
And so Saint-Gobain moved on to the Federal Circuit to obtain such
review.
D The Federal Circuit Panel Opinion in Siemens
Unlike the district court, the Federal Circuit was in a position to
decide the legal question de novo.' To wit, can an accused product that
was separately patented as nonobvious over the asserted patent
nonetheless be "insubstantially different" so as to infringe under the
doctrine of equivalents? At the very least, should the plaintiff face a
heightened burden of proving equivalent infringement under such
circumstances?"' Because there was no binding Supreme Court
precedent on the issue, here was an opportunity for the Federal Circuit to
lean on the side of the scholarly consensus identified above,"' protecting
unclaimed consideration.
Two of three judges on the panel failed to seize this opportunity.
Judge Lourie's majority opinion acknowledged that "Saint-Gobain makes
an interesting argument, not illogical, (and ably articulated by the dissent)
regarding a correspondence between the nonobviousness of an accused
product, as shown by its separate patentability, and its infringement of
another patent under the doctrine of equivalents.""'' ° Despite the logic of
Saint-Gobain's position that a nonobvious improvement of a claimed
invention cannot also be insubstantially different from that invention, the
majority declined to disturb the judgment of equivalent infringement.'
Much of the majority decision was devoted to pointing out that Saint-
Gobain had no precedent directly supporting its position."' However, if
199. Jd. at 310.
200. Siemens Med. Sols. USA, Inc. v. Saint-Gobain Ceramics & Plastics, Inc., 637 E3d
1269, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ("[T]he standard of review on a motion for a new trial is abuse of
discretion unless the court's denial of the motion is based on application of a legal precept, in
which case our review is plenary." (emphasis added)) (quoting Curley v. Klem, 499 E3d 199, 206
(3d Cir. 2007)); see also id. ("Whether a jury instruction is erroneous is legally a question of
law.").
201. Id
202. See infia Part Ii.
203. Siemens, 637 E3d at 1279.
204. Id at 1291.
205. Id. at 1280 (noting that the statement in Festo that equivalent infringement "is at least
considerably more difficult to make out" under these circumstances was dictum) (quoting Festo
Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kabushiki Co., 493 E3d 1368, 1379-80 (Fed. Cir. 2008)); id. (noting
that Judge Nies's statement that "[a] substitution in a patented invention cannot be both
nonobvious and insubstantial" was not in a precedential opinion) (quoting Roton Barrier, Inc. v.
Stanley Works, 79 F.3d 1112, 1128 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (Nies, J., additional views)).
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the issue was a matter of first impression, this was exactly what gave the
Federal Circuit the opportunity to develop the law in favor of unclaimed
consideration.
The majority asserted that the issue had been addressed by the 1929
case Sanitary Reftgerator Co. v Winters,°6 in which the Supreme Court
declined to vacate a finding of equivalent infringement supported by
"undisputed facts" on the basis that the accused product was subject to a
separate patent.7 The majority quoted the Sanitary Refi'gemtor opinion
for the proposition, "[n]or is the infringement avoided ... by any
presumptive validity that may attach to the Schrader patent by reason of
its issuance after the Winters and Crampton patent.'2 8  However, the
majority's ellipsis conceals a critical phrase in the Supreme Court's
statement, which reads in full, "[n]or is the infringement avoided, under
the controlling weight of the undisputed facts, by any presumptive
validity that may attach to the Schrader patent by reason of its issuance
after the Winters and Crampton patent."' 9 As Judge Dyk argued in his
dissent from the denial of the petition for rehearing en banc, in Sanitary
Refigerator the facts were undisputed that the accused equivalent was
"merely a colorable departure from the [claimed] structure" and a "close
copy which [sought] to use the substance of the invention ... [to]
perform precisely the same offices with no change of principle."2 '
"Evidently, the Court found that the 'controlling weight of the undisputed
facts' overcame the subsequent patent's presumption of validity, not that
the presumption of validity was irrelevant."2 ' This is in contrast to
Siemens, where there were copious disputed facts regarding equivalent
infringement, because the question had to be decided by a jury following
the district court's finding that Siemens had failed to prove that it was
likely to prevail on the merits of proving equivalent infringement.2 But
most critically, there is no indication in Sanitary Refitgerator that the
patent on the accused product issued as novel and nonobvious after the
USPTO explicitly examined the asserted patent, as occurred in
206. Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30 (1929).
207. Siemens, 637 E3d at 1280 (discussing SanitaryRefiigerator, 280 U.S. at 36-43).
208. Id. at 1280 (quoting SanitaryRefrigerator, 280 U.S. at 43).
209. SanitaryRefrigemtor, 280 U.S. at 43 (emphasis added).
210. Id. at 41-42 (quoted in Siemens Med. Sols. USA, Inc. v. Saint-Gobain Ceramics &
Plastics, Inc., 647 E3d 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Dyk, J., dissenting from the denial of the
petition for rehearing en bane)).
211. Siemens, 647 F.3d at 1380 (Dyk, J., dissenting from the denial of the petition for
rehearing en banc).
212. See supra Part IliI.B.
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Siemens.23 Accordingly, there was no binding precedent o prevent the
Federal Circuit from protecting the unclaimed consideration represented
by Saint-Gobain's follow-on innovation from the snares of a patent over
which it issued as nonobvious.
The panel majority rejected Saint-Gobain's argument that a
nonobvious improvement could not be an insubstantially different
equivalent by pointing out that the tests for nonobviousness and
equivalent infringement are articulated differently. "The doctrine of
equivalents.., typically involves application of the insubstantial
difference test, usually via the function-way-result-test,' wrote the
majority.2 4 "Obviousness, by contrast, requires analysis under the four
Graham factors."25 This is a distinction that makes little difference in this
context. Granted, the Graham factors do not speak explicitly of an
"insubstantial difference." Rather, those factors require the court to
determine, inter alia, whether the differences between the prior art and
the claims at issue are sufficiently minor to render the invention
obvious.2 '6 In determining "the difference" between the prior art and the
patented claims, the courts undertake an exercise that is intellectually
indistinguishable from the exercise of determining whether an accused
equivalent is "insubstantially different" from an asserted claim.2 7
The majority further pointed out that the nonobviousness inquiry is
different from equivalent infringement because it takes into account
secondary considerations, uch as "objective evidence of commercial
success" of the accused product."8 But as the majority conceded, the
Saint-Gobain's accused product was a tremendous commercial success."9
If the accused product's substitution of yttrium for lutetium was so
substantially different from the '080 patent as to be technically
nonobvious, and this substitution also resulted in commercial success,
why wasn't that commercial success further evidence that the Saint-
213. See Sanitary Refrigerator, 280 U.S. at 43 ("Nor is infringement avoided, under the
controlling weight of the undisputed facts, by any presumptive validity that may attach to the
Schrader patent by reason of its issuance after the Winters and Crampton patent.").
214. Siemens Med. Solutions USA, Inc. v. Saint-Gobain Ceramics & Plastics, Inc., 637
F3d at 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
215. Id (citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966)).
216. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17 (1966).
217. Siemens, 637 F.3d at 1292 (Prost, J., dissenting) ("If a skilled artisan, at the time of
the accused infringement, viewed a substitution to a patented invention as insubstantially different
from the claim, the substitution is equivalent and infringement may arise.") (citing Graver Tank &
Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 606, 609 (1950) ("An important factor is whether
persons reasonably skilled in the art would have known of the interchangeability of an ingredient
not contained in the patent with one that was.")).
218. Siemens, 637 F3d at 1282.
219. Id.
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Gobain product was more than insubstantially different from the '080
patent?
In her dissent from the majority opinion, Judge Prost traced this
unavoidable similarity between the obviousness inquiry and the
equivalent infringement test, finding that "there is an inevitable area of
overlap."22 Judge Prost reasoned as follows:
Assume a court, applying Graver Tank and its progeny, found that to a
person of skill in the art a substitution was insubstantially different from a
claim limitation. Having so found, and setting aside (for the moment)
consideration of the time frames at which obviousness and equivalence are
assessed, the court would need only a further finding that the skilled artisan
had some reason to make the substitution to find the limitation obvious
under Graham and KSR. This is not a high bar. For a truly insubstantial
change, the predictability of outcome when substituting the one for the
other suggests that a reason to combine will be easy to prove."'
In short, the logic is compelling that an accused product that is
patentably distinct and nonobvious in light of an asserted patent claim
cannot be "insubstantially different" from that patent claim such that it
infringes under the doctrine of equivalents. To quote Judge Nies, "[a]
substitution in a patented invention cannot be both nonobvious and
insubstantial.""22 Given this compelling logic, and given that the Federal
Circuit was not bound by any Supreme Court precedent, why not hold
that there is no equivalent infringement under these circumstances? The
Saint-Gobain accused product was a commercially successful,
nonliterally infringing follow-on innovation to the '080 patent.2 23 It was,
therefore, precisely the type of unclaimed consideration society sought in
exchange for granting the '080 patent monopoly. The panel majority,
220. Id at 1292.
221. Id. (Prost, J., dissenting). The majority pointed out that the equivalent infringement
and obviousness inquiries are further different because they are analyzed from different time
frame perspectives. The obviousness inquiry asks whether an invention would have been obvious
at the time of invention. Equivalent infringement asks whether an accused product was
insubstantially different from the asserted patent at the time of infringement. See id. But the
majority offered no reason why this compels the conclusion that a nonobvious improvement of a
patented invention can nonetheless be insubstantially different from that invention. If Saint-
Gobain's patented product was not obvious in light of the '080 invention on February 17, 2000,
when the '420 patent application was filed, how could that same Saint-Gobain patented product
be insubstantially different from the '080 invention in January 2008 when Siemens accused it of
equivalent infringement? What happened between 2000 and 2008 to make something that was
patentably distinct and nonobvious from the '080 patent become insubstantially different from the
'080 patent? The Siemens panel majority offered no explanation.
222. Roton Barrier Inc., v. Stanley Works, 79 E3d 1112, 1128 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (Nies, J.,
additional views).
223. Siemens, 637 E3dat 1282.
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when given the opportunity, should not have allowed the '080 patent to
ensnare by equivalents the very unclaimed consideration in return for
which that patent was granted.
E The Denial ofRehearing En Banc and the Danger Posed by the
Doctrine ofEquivalents to Unclaimed Consideration
The legal question posed by the Siemens case was contentious and
closely decided. The Federal Circuit's order denying Saint-Gobain's
petition for rehearing en banc (often a routine, one-line affair) was this
time accompanied by three separate concurring opinions and a dissent in
which three judges joined.22" The opinions hint at a distinct difference in
perspective on patent philosophy among the members of the court and
also reveal the danger the doctrine of equivalents poses to unclaimed
consideration.
Judge Dyk's opinion, dissenting from the denial of rehearing,
framed the issue as follows: "whether, under the doctrine of equivalents,
a patent claim's scope can encompass a new and separately patented (or
patentable) invention."'225 This framing of the inquiry reveals a concern
for the power claimed inventions have to swallow by equivalents follow-
on innovations: nonobvious improvements to a claimed invention that
are a critical component of the unclaimed consideration society receives
in return for the patent grant. This perspective becomes more
pronounced as the opinion discusses the proper function and scope of the
doctrine of equivalents:
The theory of the doctrine of equivalents is that an inventor should receive
protection for the full scope of his invention, even if the claim language
does not literally cover it. The doctrine of equivalents is not designed to
enable the patent holder to secure the tights to a new invention that the
inventor did not create. 1
6
The doctrine of equivalents was originally recognized to prevent
copyists from avoiding infringement on a technicality by making some
minor, insubstantial change to the patented invention.27 "[T]o permit
imitation of a patented invention which does not copy every literal detail
would be to convert the protection of the patent grant into a hollow and
useless thing."'28 For that reason the proper scope of the doctrine is to
224. Siemens Med. Sols. USA, Inc. v. Saint-Gobain Ceramics & Plastics, Inc., 647 F.3d
1373 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (on petition for rehearing en banc).
225. Id. at 1378 (Dyk, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).
226. Id. at 1379 (emphasis added).
227. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 606, 607 (1950).
228. Id
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prohibit "the unscrupulous copyist" from making "unimportant and
insubstantial changes and substitutions in the patent that though adding
nothing, would be enough to take the copied matter outside the claim,
and hence outside the reach of law."'229
Correspondingly, the doctrine should not be stretched to encompass
changes and substitutions that do add something, changes substantial
enough to constitute a further innovation that provides further benefit to
the public. As Judge Dyk argued, "a product cannot be insubstantially
different if it is nonobvious and separately patentable.""23 If the doctrine
is used to ensnare follow-on, nonobvious innovations, "this approach will
deter innovation and hamper legitimate competition."23' In short, the
majority's approach threatened to allow patents to hamper unclaimed
consideration, and as the various schools of patent theory increasingly
recognize, unclaimed consideration is the very benefit society should
receive in exchange for the patent grant.232
The three concurrences in the denial of rehearing display a wholly
different approach. Judge Lourie opined, "Contrary to the dissent's
assertion that our decision 'will deter innovation and hamper legitimate
competition,' this case exemplifies the patent system working as it should
to enforce a patentee's right to exclude-the only right embodied in the
grant of a patent."'233 In her separate opinion, Judge Newman elaborated
on this theme that broadening the reach of patent claims through the
doctrine of equivalents fosters innovation.34 Judge Newman was
concerned that limiting the doctrine of equivalents to nonobvious
modifications would "diminish ... the economic incentive to create new
products.'" '35 She developed this incentive theory further by quoting at
length from her separate opinion in the en banc Festo decision:
A national economic policy that weighs on the side of fostering
development and investment in new technology will have a different
approach to the law of equivalency than an economic policy aimed at
facilitating competition by minor change in existing products. Any
tightening or loosening of access to the doctrine of equivalents shifts the
balance between inventor and copier.3 6
229. Id.
230. Siemens, 647 E3d at 1379 (Dyk, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).
231. Idat 1380.
232. See supra Part II.
233. Siemens, 647 E3d at 1375 (Lourie, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc).
234. Id.
235. Id. at 1376 (Newman, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc).
236. Id at 1377 (quoting Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 344 E3d
1359, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (en banc) (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Judge Newman went on to argue that if the doctrine of
equivalents were cabined, "[t]he consequences for the
innovation incentive are not addressed.1
237
Judge Newman's concurrence is therefore wholly grounded in the
reward theory of patents.238 The reward theory maintains that the primary
purpose of the patent laws is to provide an "incentive to invent.
239
Because information can be freely appropriated, researchers need the
incentive of a patent in order to make inventions.2"0  Hence, when the
Constitution seeks "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and the useful
Arts" by giving Congress the power to issue patents, the sole measure of
that "Progress" is the receipt by society of patented inventions.'
The problem is that the reward theory, although it enjoys a fine
lineage, has been subjected to a wide body of literature pointedly
criticizing its premises and conclusions for at least forty years. The point
upon which the various modem theories of patent law discussed above
agree is that incentivizing claimed inventions alone is not a sufficient
justification for the patent system.2 In brief, disclosure theory maintains
that patent rights are granted to encourage the publication of claimed
inventions and also other technical information.2"3 Commercialization
theory maintains that patent law should encourage innovaon--the full
development of commercial products-rather than just new inventions.2"
Prospect theory maintains that early, broad patent rights are granted so
that first claimants have an incentive and ability to coordinate the
development of inventions into innovations without the wasteful
duplication of efforts. " Patent race theory maintains that the patent laws
should encourage patent races, because innovations are achieved
incrementally when multiple researchers investigate the same problem,
and many important advances are achieved by the losers of patent
races.211 Patent signaling theory argues that a primary value of patents
are not in their claimed inventions at all; rather, patents are valuable
237. Id.
238. See supm Part I (describing the reward theory).
239. NARD, supranote 15, at 31.
240. See id; see also Grady & Alexander, supra note 16, at 310-11 (citing ADAM SMITH,
THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 189, 339 (James E. Thorold Rogers ed., 2d ed. Oxford, The Clarendon
Press 1880) (1776); JOHN B. CLARK, ESSENTIALS OF ECONOMIC THEORY 358-72 (photo. reprint
1968) (1927)).
241. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
242. See supra Part II.
243. See supr Part 11.B.
244. See supr Part II.C.
245. See supra Part lI.D.
246. See supra Part 11.E.
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because they efficiently signal information about companies to allow for
efficient and informed investment."7 Judge Newman's concurring
opinion in Siemens disregarded all of these alternative justifications for
the patent system when she focused only on fostering the incentive for
making claimed inventions.
In discussing "the innovation incentive," the concurring opinions in
Siemens failed to recognize that encouraging claimed inventions is not
the only way to promote "Progress." The accused Saint-Gobain product
was also an innovation, and a commercially successful innovation at
that.248 In fact, it embodied a nonobvious, separately patentable,
improvement over the claims of the asserted '080 patent.249 The Saint-
Gobain product therefore represents an important aspect of the
unclaimed consideration society received in exchange for granting the
'080 patent monopoly. How does it help innovation if we stretch the
claims of the '080 patent to ensnare follow-on innovations that are
patentably distinct from it-if we "enable the patent holder to secure the
rights to a new invention that the inventor did not create[?]""25 This is the
innovation incentive that is not addressed by the Siemens concurring
opinions. The concurring opinions in Siemens also did not consider
whether focusing myopically on encouraging claimed inventions is an
effective way to encourage innovations when the majority of claimed
inventions are never commercialized for the benefit of the public.
This is the danger of the doctrine of equivalents. To the extent
patent claims are expanded through the doctrine of equivalents to
encompass more than i substantial changes to patented inventions, the
doctrine may be used to enjoin or tax with damages the very unclaimed
consideration patent law should be engineered to promote. This danger
is thrown into stark relief by Chief Judge Rader's concurring opinion in
Siemens. Judge Rader wrote that the doctrine of equivalents was
properly cabined because "if an equivalent was foreseeable as available
technology at the time of filing, the applicant has an obligation to claim
that technology."'25 Conversely, "the doctrine of equivalents allows patent
owners to cover after-arising technology."'52 And so the current state of
247. Seesupm Part I.
248. Siemens Med. Sols. USA, Inc. v. Saint-Gobain Ceramics & Plastics, Inc., 637 E3d
1269, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
249. See supra Part t1l.B.
250. Siemens Med. Sols. USA, Inc. v. Saint-Gobain Ceramics & Plastics, Inc., 647 F3d
1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Dyk, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).
251. Id. at 1376 (Rader, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc).




the law provides for the following perverse result with respect to follow
on innovations: if an accused equivalent was foreseeable-a modifica-
tion so obvious that the inventor could have explicitly claimed it at the
time of invention-it may escape infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents. However, if an accused technology embodies later
developed technology-an advance that the inventor could not have
foreseen or claimed at the time of invention-then it might well be
ensnared by the doctrine of equivalents. As James R. Holbrook
observed, "[t]he patent system is arguably providing a windfall: it
protects an invention the patent holder did not invent, and furthermore
could not have invented."'253 A broad reading of the doctrine of equiva-
lents threatens to ensnare some of the very unclaimed consideration-
further, nonobvious advances and innovations-that is the primary
benefit society receives in exchange for granting patents.
Nor is this danger to unclaimed consideration posed by the doctrine
of equivalents effectively tempered by the phenomenon of "blocking
patents." The blocking patents doctrine begins with the recognition that a
party that literally practices each of the limitations of a claimed invention
generally does not avoid infringement by adding additional features."'
However, the additional features may render the infringing product
sufficiently novel and nonobvious that it qualifies for a patent in its own
right, an "improvement patent.255 The owner of the improvement patent
still suffers from an inability to practice her improvement because it will
still infringe the first patent, the "dominant patent.""25 But nor may the
owner of the dominant patent practice the second, improvement patent.257
Theoretically, under such circumstances, the parties will have an
incentive to cross-license their patents so that each may practice the
improved innovation.28  The public will thereby benefit from the
commercialization of the improvement.
253. See Timothy R. Holbrook, Equivalency and Patent Law Possession Paradox, 23
HARV. J.L. &TECH. 1, 6 (2009).
254. NARD, supra note 15, at 457 ("Literal infringement cannot be avoided if the accused
device contains additional elements not found in the claim."). This is assuming the claim
preamble concludes with the word "comprising," rather than the phrase, "consisting of" Id
("The term comprising raises a presumption that the list of elements is nonexclusive .... In
contrast, use of the transition phrase 'consisting of' indicates that the claim is closed (that is, that
invention is limited to no more and no fewer than the listed limitations)." (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted)).
255. JANICE M. MUELLER, PATENT LAW 18 (4th ed. 2013).
256. Id. at 19.
257. Id.
258. Id. (citing Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown:
The Case of Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REv. 75 (1994)).
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Also in theory, the blocking patents doctrine should assuage the
concerns I raise with a patent excluding under a broad doctrine of
equivalents a USPTO-certified nonobvious improvement on that
patented invention. After all, Siemens should have had a strong incentive
to practice Saint-Gobain's improved, commercially successful scintillator
and therefore cross-license Saint-Gobain's patent so that both companies
could have marketed the improvement to the benefit of the public.
However, as this case study demonstrates, this theory is not what
happened in practice. Instead of brokering a cross-license, Siemens
sought to exclude the Saint-Gobain product from the market through an
infringement suit seeking damages and immediate injunction relief.259 It
is likely the parties could not come to terms on a cross-license, or
perhaps Siemens found that it was more profitable to exclude its
competitor's improvement from the market altogether, rather than allow
for both parties to compete in marketing the improvement. Such details
are unavailable on the public record. The result, however, was that there
was no cross-license facilitated by the blocking patents phenomenon. Or,
if there was a cross-license brokered as part of a settlement following the
Federal Circuit proceedings, it came only after lengthy, expensive
infringement litigation that bled resources from the courts and from the
parties. The blocking patents doctrine therefore failed to facilitate the
efficient commercialization of Saint-Gobain's innovative new scintillator,
much to the detriment of the public."' It was far more efficient for the
Federal Circuit to decide the question by declaring that nonobvious,
nonliterally infringing improvements over a claimed invention cannot
infringe that patent under the doctrine of equivalents.
Moreover, the blocking patents doctrine does nothing to release
separately patented innovations from the thicket of earlier patent claims
when those earlier patents are owned by nonpracticing entities.
Nonpracticing entities have no incentive to cross-license improvement
patents because they produce no commercial products themselves. And
the majority of infringement litigation in this country is brought by
nonpracticing entities."'
259. Siemens Med. Sols. USA, Inc. v. Saint-Gobain Ceramics & Plastics, Inc., No. 07-
190-SLR, 2008 WL 114361, at *1 (D. Del. Jan. 8, 2008) (order denying preliminary injunction).
260. Mark Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX.
L. REV. 989, 1010 (2008) ("Unless the parties bargain, no one gets the benefit of the
improvement").
261. Feldman, Ewing & Jeruss, supra note 9, at 13 (estimating that patent trolls filed
58.7% of the patent infringement lawsuits in 2012, and observing that trolls frequently target
start-up companies in the interet and technology sectors) (citing John R. Allison et al., Patent
Litigation and the Inteme4 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3, 4 (2012)).
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The solution to these concerns was easily within the grasp of the
Federal Circuit. The court could have ruled that accused products cannot
equivalently infringe patents over which they are patently distinct.
Hence, protecting unclaimed consideration from claimed inventions
does not necessarily require radical changes to our patent laws that are
unlikely to be implemented. Rather, it may require nothing more than
modest changes in judicial philosophy in approaching close cases and
questions of first impression. In developing the law through judicial
precedent, judges should lean on the side of protecting and fostering the
unclaimed consideration that society receives in exchange for the patent
grant, rather than blindly strengthening the reach of claimed inventions,
the majority of which are never developed into an innovation for the
benefit of the public. Policing the doctrine of equivalents is but one
example. Reforms to the reverse doctrine of equivalents, patent
exhaustion, and other doctrines could also benefit from this perspective
in judicial philosophy.
IV. CONCLUSION
In formulating patent policy, due attention should be paid to the
benefit society receives in the form of unclaimed consideration as a quid
pro quo in the patentee's social contract. Patent reforms and judicial
decisions should give sufficient breathing room to this unclaimed
consideration, which modern theories of patent law increasingly
recognize as the primary value society receives in return for the patent
grant. However, we need not propose radical reforms to the nature of our
patent laws because these are unlikely to achieve consensus and could
have unforeseen consequences for the innovation ecosystem. Rather, in
close cases and cases of first impression, judges should lean on the side
of protecting unclaimed consideration from the thicket of patent claims
that threatens it.
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